Risk aversion is a fundamental concept in economics used to explain agents' behavior under uncertainty. Risk aversion in auctions has been justified through the many uncertainties faced by bidders and through the large value of bids relative to bidders' assets. In first-price auctions, risk aversion renders more aggress sive bidding, while bidding in ascending auc tions is not affected, leading to the dominance of the sealed-bid mechanism over the ascending one. Risk aversion has been tested extensively on experimental data, as overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium is frequently observed. In view of recent developments in the structural estimation of auction models, Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu (2005) show that the risk-aversion model provides the best fit for experimental data.
Given larger financial stakes, it is likely that bidders' risk aversion is present in field auction data as welL The theoretical auction literature does not provide simple implications that can be tested on bidding data. Consequently, detecting risk aversion in auctions is difficult if not impos sible. More generally with microeconomic data, risk aversion can be detected only when diver sification occurs, such as in portfolio manage ment and in auctions with diversification across species, as in Susan Athey and Jonathan Levin (2001) . This calls for the necessity of structural modeling to evaluate bidders' risk aversion. In the structural approach, observed bids are assumed to be the outcome of the Bayesian-Nash equi librium of a particular model. Though a tight structure is imposed to explain observed bids, Thus, recovering risk aversion impose some restrictions. We discuss sible restrictions: (a) partial n''''''n'1,,,t,,,ri the auction model. (b) exogeneity of of bidders, and (c) additional bidding first case, parameterizing the utility not sufficient, as an increase in the parameter such as constant RRA ,,-~.,.I.'-.c..., compensated forby a shrinkage of the the valuation distribution leading to the observations. Similarly, parameterizing lying valuation distribution does not recovery of the utility function. A both is necessary to identify the model, eterization of the utility function and ization of a conditional quantile of the distribution. In the second case, assummg neity of the number of bidders allows us to the bidders' utility function without assumption. This exclusion restriction spirit of instrumental variables. In the the availability of ascending anction data the recovery of the underlying disl:ribllltiCt11., can be used in first-price auction data to the bidders' utility function. This paper· these results while relying on three " ..til'l"", · Campo et al. (2006) ; Guerre, Perrigne, (2006) ; and Jingfeng Lu and Perrigne
The paper is structured as follows. introduces the auction model and nonidentification of risk aversion. presents the identification of risk parametric restrictions, and briefly estimation of risk aversion. Section III is
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identification of risk aversion under exc1u re:stricti()ns. Section IV considers the iden of risk aversion using additional data. 
boundary condition s(y) = y. observations consist of the pair (I,G), G(') is the distribution of equilibrium Following Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong the previous differential equation can be rewritten as
AO is strictly increasing. This equation each bidder's private value as a func of his corresponding bid, the bid distribu and density, the number of bidders, and the function. Note that equation (1) provides expression of the inverse of the bidding strat s(·). We now address the problem of iden of the model structure (U,F) from ,,,p"\m"'PQ (I,G), namely whether the structure be recovered uniquely from the observa Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2006) pro some smoothness conditions on U(·) and which in turn imply some smoothness con ons(·) and G(·). See Definitions 1-3 and Inl~orlem 1 in that paper.
The proof of such a result is obtained by con a structure [a, F] such that 00 =
,witho E (0, I) leading to the same distribution GO as [U,F] . It then remains to check that [O,F] satisfies the smoothness con ditions and leads to an increasing inverse equi librium strategy. As such, [O,F] and [U,F] are observationally equivalent. Since the risk-neutral model with U(·) being the identity function is identified, this suggests that nonidentification arises from the unknown UO. As a matter of fact, any bid distribution GO satisfying some smoothness conditions can be rationalized by a CRRA or a constant ARA (CARA) struc ture. By allowing risk aversion, one can explain almost any bid distribution. This problem arises because of the weakness of the restrictions imposed by the model on observables. In par ticular, in view of observations, we cannot dis criminate a model with arbitrary risk aversion from a CRRA or a CARA model. Since a risk neutral model is a special risk-averse model, any risk-neutral model may lead a priori to the same bid observations as some CRRA or CARA modeL It is worth noting that these results still hold when considering a binding-reserve price, a random-reserve price, affiliated-private val ues, and asymmetric bidders.
II. Identification of Risk Aversion under Parametric Restrictions
A first identifying strategy is to introduce some partial parametric restrictions since a fully parametric model is almost always identi fied. Though the source of the problem comes from the bidders' utility function, a first natu ral choice would be to parameterize the private value distribution F(') as F(·;'}'). A second nat ural choice would be to parameterize the utility function UO as U(;8), though little is known about the nature of bidders' risk aversion. 
Ai(-) = Vi(')!V;'O and Hj \:) = 2,j'Fjgi')/G/).
This leads to some compatibility conditions that can be used to achieve identification of the asymmetric auction model. Given these nonidentification results, more parametric restrictions need to be made to achieve identification. On one hand, param eterizing FO leaves little choice as additional parameterization of VO would lead to a fully parametric model. On the other hand, param eterizing V(·) leaves some flexibility as FO can be partially parameterized through one quan tile. The preceding phenomenon of compen sation between risk aversion and the quantiles of F(') suggests that this parameterization will pin down that quantile, thereby identifying the model. This idea is exploited further by consid ering heterogeneity across auctions embodied in some observed characteristics Z or in the number of bidders 1. This leads to the structure 
III. Identification of Risk Aversion Exclusion Restrictions
There is no general agreement omists on which concept of risk the most appropriate to explain tleftaVI0F uncertainty. Moreover, little is the shape of agents' utility turlctl;Dn. of this, it is interesting to exploit tions beyond parameterization to ders' utility function. Exclusion are common in econometrics, e.g., in with instrumental variables to solve for (jgene11lY of education. More recently, exclu ¥aotrlt'tlClnQ such as exogenous bidders' par in auctions have been used to test for value. A similar idea can be exploited bidders' utility function. Specifically, bidders' participation, which leads to private value distribution independent of of bidders, is considered. Variations bid distribution in the number of bidders, the private value distribution remains the identify the bidders' utility function since ). For simplicity, consider two levels )mIJet:ltion with 12 > II leading to the bid .lUUUV"" Gz{-) and Gk).
v" does not vary with I, equation (2) tOUlec<om1Datllbll~1Ity condition rl [[lI(I, -1 
)]
A- Another identification strategy exploits addi tional bidding data. Specifically, data from two auction designs can be used to identify the bid ders' utility function. A striking feature of risk aversion is that it does not affect bidding in an ascending auction since bidding his private value remains a dominant strategy. Thus, ascending auction data can be exploited to identify the underlying distribution of private values. In par ticular, the observed winning bids in ascending auctions can be interpreted as the second-high est private values. Using distribution of order statistics, it becomes straightforward to rerover the distribution F(') as shown by Athey and Philip A. Haile (2002) . Once the latter is iden tified, equation (2) can be used to recover the bidders' utility function on [0, max"(v,, -b"J] using the quantiles of F(·) and GO from first price, sealed-bid auction data. The result extends to a binding-reserve price and asymmetric bidders. On the other hand, when private values are affiliated, the observa tion of the winning bid is not sufficient to recover the distribution of private values, as the affilia tion among private values cannot be captured by a single bid. Using two auction designs is valid, however, if the same set of bidders participate in both auctions. Otherwise, we may face two dif ferent underlying private value distributions. This crucial assumption needs to be checked in the data. The resulting estimation procedure com bines order statistics,nonparametric estimators for distribution, and density as well as quantiles.
This paper offers a review of the identifica tion problem of risk aversion in auction models.
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AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
Various restrictions, such as partial parameter ization of the structure, exclusion restric tions, and the use of additional data, are used to achieve identification of the bidders' util ity function. The results extend to more gen eral models including a binding-reserve price, affiliated-private values, and asymmetric bid ders. The methods above have been applied to timber auction data, where significant risk aver sion has been found. Uncertainty may affect bidders' private values, such as in a model with stochastic private values, in which a random shock realized ex post changes the winner's pri vate value. Such an uncertainty affects bidding behavior under risk aversion. Given the ex post uncertainties faced by bidders in construction procurements, extension of the current results to stochastic private values may have interesting economic applications.
